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Ever since the Sophists of Greece opposed to the order of the law an 
order of nature, valid by its own essence and spontaneity, there has been 
repeated, in juridical literature, as a kind of Leitmotiv of an interminable 
symphony, the idea that there exists a law which does not oblige through 
human prescription but through the intrinsic goodness of its command. The 
ius naturale has been opposed to the ius positivum as the model to its copy, 
the objective to the subjective, the perfect to the imperfect, the eternal to the 
mutable. While some authors admit the coexistence of the two orders, others 
think that only one of them can be authentic law. For those who, with 
Leibniz, hold that justice is the inseparable attribute of the juridical, there 
is no other law than the objectively valid one; for those who declare with 
Kelsen that only that order is juridical which is capable of securing its own 
efficacy-independently of the goodness of its prescriptions-there is only 
positive law. 
There are, then, three theoretical possibilities concerning the relation 
between natural law and positive law: the theory of the two orders, which 
states the coexistence of both; juridical positivist monism, which negates 
the validity of natural law; and ius naturae monism, which holds that there 
exists no other law than the one intrinsically valid. The partisans of the 
dualist position cannot escape the problem of the connection between the 
two orders, nor that of possible conflicts between the norms of either. This 
leads them necessarily-especially on the hypothesis of such discrepancy- 
to the notion of primacy of one order as against the other, either the naturaI 
over the positive or the positive over the natural. But in this case they 
usually do not consider that their procedure is equivalent to recognizing 
that only one of the orders is genuine law, and therefore to invalidating the 
discrepant, or opposed, norm of the order declared to be of inferior rank. 
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Those who accept connections of supra- or sub-ordination between the two 
laws put the difficulty in the same form in which, for example, within a 
federation the problem of opposition between federal law and local juridical 
rules is being resolved. This supposes the hierarchical diversity of such 
orders and the subordination of the latter under the former or, in other 
words, the principle that the supreme criterion of validity is given by a 
basic norm. 
The question is similar to that of the connection between national and 
international law, or that of antinomy between juridical or other orders to 
which a common ultimate foundation of validity is attributed. I 
The logical scheme adopted in these cases is always the same: when 
within a normative system there exists a plurality of partial orders of differ- 
ent rank, their validity depends on their subjection to the norms of the 
order postulated as supreme. When, on the contrary, it is not a question of 
different orders of a complex system but of systems whose bases of validity 
are different, the opposition between contradictory norms is solved, from 
the point of view of each of these orders, with absolute denial of the norma- 
tive nature of the others. This, on the other hand, is equivalent to sup- 
pressing the conflict. Thus, for example, proceeds the organ of the state 
when, on the hypothesis of an antinomy between the law in force and an 
ethical demand, or a postulate of ills naturae, it denies validity to the latter 
and applies the norms of the legal order in force. 
Let us now ask what is the supreme logical principle which enters into 
pIay in all these cases. It  is none other but the principle of sufficient reason. 
This principle can, in the juridical field, be expressed as follows: Every 
legal norm, in order t o  be valid, requires a sufficient reason for its validity. 
This is all logic teaches in this case: if a norm is valid it is because it has a 
sufficient foundation of validity. But what is or in what consists this foun- 
dation is not any more a logical problem but one of positive law. In other 
words: the principle can only be applied when there exists a supreme 
criterion of juridical validity. And this latter must be postulated by the 
basic norm of each juridical order. 
The principle not only presupposes that there is an ultimate criterion of 
validity but it claims the uniqueness of this criterion. The duality, or in 
general the plurality, of the criteria would rob them of their character of 
authentic or, to express it differently, of ultimate criteria. For various crite- 
ria can only subsist side by side if their rank is unequal; which means that 
there is one of superior rank and that this, at the same time, is unique. 
But if the supreme criterion of validity has to be unique it is impossible 
to admit that juridical orders of different foundation can be equally obliga- 
tory; and therefore it is impossible to defend the coexistence-in a plane of 
coordination-of a positive and of a natural juridical order; or, to speak 
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more precisely, the coexistence of two laws, one formally valid and the 
other valid in and for itself. 
The contraposition positive law-natural law presupposes at bottom the 
of two different foundations. The postulate for positive legal 
orders is always, by the internal logic of the positivistic attitude, an extrinsic 
one. The postulate for natural law is, by the internal logic of that doctrine, 
an intrinsic one. 
From the point of view of public power there is no other law than the 
one created or recognized (implicitly or explicitly) by the organs of that 
power. Or, expressed differently, only those are juridical norms which arise 
from the formal sources: legislation, custom, or jurisprudence, and which 
are not opposed to the fundamental law. The validity of these norms 
depends on the combination of a series of requirements concerning the 
process of creation; moreover, it depends on the requirement that they 
must not oppose the norms of the partial order of superior rank or, ulti- 
mately, the basic norm. What is in question, therefore, is not any reference 
to the goodness or justice of the norms, but only to the regularity of the 
process of their creation and their compatibility with the fundamental or 
supreme norm. 
On the other hand, both in the case of isolated norms and of entire 
systems of law, their justification can be made dependent on the goodness 
or the intrinsic justice of their commands. There arises thus, beside the 
criterion already examined, another criterion which, instead of taking into 
account the form of creation of the norms or their compatibility with norms 
of higher rank, considers only the objective validity of the legal precepts 
in question. While the first of the two criteria does not refer to the content 
but the form in which the norms in question have been created, or their 
relation with others of the system, the second criterion can lead to the 
result that what is extrinsically or  formally valid as law does yet lack 
intrinsic validity. To recognize that a Iaw exists as part of a juridical order 
and at the same time negate its justification is possible only when this law 
is examined successively in the light of the two criteria, that of formal and 
material validity in the positive sense, and that of intrinsic validity in the 
axiologica1 sense. In that case, it is both possible to admit the existence of 
an order which pretends to be valid as law and which has efficacy, and to 
put in doubt its justice. 
When it is not the normative power of individual norms but that of a 
whole legal system that is in question, it must be remembered that its 
creators and executives never subordinate the attribute of the system's 
normative power to the judgment about goodness or justice of those obli- 
gated under the system. To submit in this point to the opinion of the sub- 
jects would not only presuppose the negation of the system's authority; it 
would also mean to disavow the validity of its norms. PhiIosophers adduce, 
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to justify this position, the lack of universally recognized criteria of valua- 
tion. If neither science nor juridical philosophy, said Radbruch in 1932, 
are capable of showing us what is just and what is unjust, then will and 
power must be called upon to decide what is to be valid as law and what 
n0t.l As there are no unequivocal rules for judging the justice of norms 
valid at a certain place and time, and as, on the other hand, it is indispens- 
able that there exist an effective juridical order for human behavior, the 
only way to create it is to establish an authority which "decides in an 
authoritarian way about the criteria which must have validity in social 
action. . . .""his does not mean that the creators of the juridical order and 
those in charge of maintaining it do not pretend that the norms of the order 
are not just; the pretension of justice exists in every case. The only thing 
the organs of the state cannot admit is that the obligatory essence of these 
norms be made dependent on rules different from the official criterion. For 
the organs of the state there is no other law than that created and recog- 
nized by them in accordance with the directives of the basic norm. They 
cannot therefore concede juridical validity to the law formulated or recog- 
nized in another form. If in a judicial procedure, for example, one of the 
parties pretends to base its demand on a principle of justice opposed to 
the positive laws, the judge must hold himself to the latter and deny pro- 
cedural acknowledgment to this principle. By the internal logic of his own 
position, therefore, he is obligated to apply one single rule of validity: that 
adopted by the public power. Auctoritns, non veritas, fmit legem. 
Equally decisive is the attitude of the advocate of natural law in face of 
the command of those in power. If the rulers pretend that their laws should 
be faithfully obeyed, such pretension cannot be founded on the fact that 
they are in condition to coerce this observance. When a ruIe of conduct 
appears wrapped in the verbal clothing of norms we must not interpret it 
as expression of the will of him who has formulated it; insofar as it imposes 
duties or confers rights its meaning can only be this: to connect with the 
cases which its hypothesis foresees certain consequences that represent 
a just regulation of such cases. The juridically prescribed must not be con- 
founded with what the legislator or those subject to the law wish that it be; 
juridically, there must be what is juridically valid, independent of whether 
someone disposes thus or ordains something else. A similar thing is true of 
subjective rights: when in such and such circumstances justice demands 
that a right be recognized to me, the legislator must recognize it to me, 
which presupposes that the attributive norm does not create such right nor 
must it be interpreted as a gracious concession by the public power. 
The criterion applied in this case does not consider the form of creation 
of each precept or its compatibility or incompatibility with the basic norm; 
it refers exclusiveIy to the intrinsic goodness or justice of the rule. To 
follow this criterion one does not have to inquire which relation exists 
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between the legal norm in question and other norms of the given legal 
order; it is sufficient to ask whether it can or cannot be interpreted as 
realizing juridical values. 
The same criterion can be applied to the examination of an entire legal 
system. In this case, the obligatory force of the system does not appear to 
reside in its existence or positivity; the only thing in question is its objec- 
tive value. But, as the use of the axi~logical criterion results sometimes in 
the assertion that the norms of a given law, far from realizing values, 
foment despotism and injustice, there arises inevitably the problem of the 
relation between the two criteria; and one cannot help asking which, in 
case of conflict, ought to  prevail. 
What the natural law doctrines of revolutionary character have in com- 
mon, at least in their critical aspect, is the assumption that above the 
positive order there exists a natural order of intrinsic validity whose norms 
must prevail over those of the positive law. Even when the coexistence of 
the two legal orders is accepted, as is the case in a number of theories, the 
justification of the positive law is made dependent on its conformity with 
the i i is  nnturae. A positive law conflicting with natural law is regarded as 
not truly law and as lacking obligatory force. 
Not all natural law doctrines, such as those of Callicles or Sophocles (in 
Antigone), have a revolutionary character; their purpose is often to justify 
the order in force. When this is their purpose, the validity of this order, or 
these orders, is made to  consist in the conformity or concordance with the 
principles of ius naturne. Instead of contraposing the former to the latter, 
what is looked for is a relation between both. The natural law is then 
regarded as a model or paradigm of the historical orders in question, and 
the value of the latter grows or decreases in the degree in which they copy 
their archetype. In these Platonic conceptions the natural law exhibits all 
the attributes of the Idea, and the positive law is a simple copy of it. The 
natural law is an ideal order, immutable, perfect, eternal; the positive law 
a real order, mutable, defective, and perishable. The one exists and is valid 
in itself and for itself; the other is law in the degree and the measure in 
which it partakes of the Idea, or the Idea is present in it. What is most 
plausibIe in these doctrines is the notion that the meaning of the positive 
order is found in its tendency of realizing certain ideal requirements which 
transcend, as Nicolai Hartmann says, their own ideality and thus become 
modulating forces of the existent. 
Within the Aristotelian conception, on the other hand, natural law rep- 
resents the end toward whose realization the positive law has to aspire. But 
as, in accordance with Aristotle's metaphysics, "the general can only act 
and exist in the individual, the positive law, as accidens gives 'existence' to 
the juridical s~bstance."~ As the fire burns in any place, "the same in 
Hellas as in Persia,"' the universal law must always manifest itself in the 
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written law and the latter, in turn, must in any case tcnd toward the reali- 
zation of the natural order. 
The natural law thinkers establish a very close-indeed, a necessary- 
connection between the validity they attribute to the contents of the izts 
naturae and the origin of the latter's norms. In the teaching of Callicles, 
for example, the reason that the natural order incarnates justice and has 
objective validity is due to the fact that its origin lies not in the decisions 
of the citizens in the legislative assen~bly but in the dictates of nature. The 
naturality or spontaneity of these dictates guarantees their immutable 
character and determines the superiority that is axiologically attributed to 
them, as against the mutability of human law. Here is revealed the intention 
of attributing to the higher order a firm foundation and of securing for its 
norms a derivation which escapes every suspicion of arbitrariness. As the 
norms of the positive law are human creations, the danger that they may 
become instruments of oppression and injustice depends on the free-and 
at times corrupted-will of its authors. 
Even though the supreme aspiration of the philosopher of justice is to 
discover the objective foundation of the law in order to surround it with a 
halo of universality and permanence, such aspiration is thwarted by the 
diversity-and at times the acute contrast-of the theories about such 
foundation. The champions of positivism use this "Achilles' heel" to 
formulate one of the strongest arguments in support of their own position. 
While their opponents discuss without any agreement among themselves 
the "nature" in which the "true" law has its origin, the holders of power 
formulate the rules regulating human society and create, for their efficacy, 
the monopoly of enforcement. Thus the value of the legal order is postu- 
lated as supreme, to the detriment of an ideal of justice which all pursue 
but none succeeds in defining in univocal f o r m . T h e  legal order neither 
does nor can make its obligatory force dependent on the opinions of the 
subjects, and it has behind itself an organization which guarantees the 
application of its precepts. 
The weak point of the thesis which sees in this interlocking of authority 
and power the foundation of the juridical order is an incorrect interpreta- 
tion of the concept of security. The partisans of positivism forget that the 
only authentic security capable of creating a genuine-a real and not an 
apparent-peace, is the one founded on justice. When the excesses of the 
legal order, whose life rests only in the force of the tyrant, overstep certain 
limits, security disappears, resistance is organized, and the order founded 
on fear is finally destroyed by the onslaught of the revolu t i~n .~  When the 
ultimate reason of validity of any system excludes the possibility of admit- 
ting, with regard to it, a duality of foundations, one must n fortiori arrive 
at the concIusion that for the organs of public power the so-called "natural 
law" is no law. And inversely, by the internal logic of their own position, 
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for the partisans of the ills natlrrae the unjust positive order is no genuine 
law but a simple "phenomenon of p ~ w e r . " ~  It is true that the goodness of a 
legal order can be made to derive from its greater or smaller content of 
justice; but in this case the criterion of validity used is not the official one. 
The proof is that as soon as this legal order stops to realize the values 
which, supposedly, constitute its own prototypc, its justification-and its 
juridical essence-have to be negated in accordance with the canon of 
izrs nQtlll.~7f?. 
For similar reasons, when it is declared that the only authentic law is the 
one "effectively" ruling the life of a community at a certain moment of its 
history, the application of this "principle of effectiveness" can result in the 
conclusion that the precepts which the dogmatic jurist or the natural law 
philosopher consider as valid from their corresponding viewpoints, are not 
law either, if they lack efficacy. 
If thus the attributes of formal validity, intrinsic validity, and efficacy 
do not imply each other reciprocally, neither do they exclude each other. 
Therefore, sometimes they coincide in one and the same rule of conduct 
and even in a set of rules. A legal disposition duly promulgated can at the 
same time be efficient and just. In such a conjunction the three attributes 
come together in a single norm, as they can also coincide in a whole body 
of law, or in the totality of the elements of a system. The union of the 
three characteristics in all norms of a juridical order would represent the 
limit or  ideal case of realization of justice in a juridically organized society. 
An order whose norms would fully realize the juridical values, not only in 
the stage of formulation but also in the final stages of application and ful- 
filln~ent, would be a perfect order and would deserve the name of law from 
any of the three points of view. In this case the different perspectives would 
be referred to a common object and would hence have to be considered as 
different aspects of one single reality. The philosopher would judge it in the 
light of the idea of justice; the sociologist would see it as an efficient 
organization of human society; and the dogmatic jurist would interpret it 
as a set of rules united by a cornnlon reference to the fundamental norm of 
a concrete state. 
The purpose of realizing juridical values in a determined historical situa- 
tion leads necessarily to the establishment of a political organization; but as 
soon as such organization exists, it claims for itself the monopoly of formu- 
lation and application of the juridical norms and regards itself obligated to 
substitute the material criterion of validity by a purely extrinsic one. There- 
fore, it denies to the subjects the right to doubt the obligatory nature of its 
mandate, and asserts that there are no  valid norms but those which, directly 
or indirectly, can be referred to the fundamental law. 
The dialectic development of the juridical idea, which begins with the 
acknowledgment of the ideals of justice, leads to the creation of an author- 
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ity which, even though its goal is the realization of these ideals, sees itself 
forced to deny them, as meta-legal criteria of valuation, since otherwise it 
would have to acknowledge two criteria of validity and hence the possibility 
of antinomies and conflicts. The axiological criterion is thus superseded by 
a purely extrinsic one. The dualism appears then as the transitory and 
relative opposition of the two initial moments of a single development 
which culminates in the over-arching synthesis of both; and the synthesis is 
achieved when the attributes of formal validity and of justice coincide in 
one and the same legal order. 
Just as the positive Iaw tends toward becoming just law, so the natural 
law tends toward becoming positive law. Between the juridical ideal and 
the fact of positivity appears the social organization charged with realizing, 
through its norms endowed with validity, the values which constitute the 
prototype of a positive order. This aim is achieved only when the concur- 
rence of the two attributes, of formal and objective validity in one and the 
same system, eliminates the possibility of value conflict. When the equilib- 
rium is destroyed and the battle resurges between the dictates of justice and 
those of the valid norms, then there appears inevitably a relation of tension; 
and the material (axiological) criterion of validity is opposed by the parties 
to the formal criterion which the holders of power consider as the only one 
applicable. The opposition can manifest itself in many forms. Its intensity 
depends on the degree of discrepancy between the opposite criteria. It  is 
possible that the critique of the valid law only pursues the reform of that 
order; but in extreme cases it can occur that the discrepancy brings about 
an attitude of resistance or even leads to revolution. 
The revolutionary movements offer a new example of the dialectic 
process in which the juridical idea develops itself. When the positive law 
does not reflect-at least to a certain degree-the values which give it 
sense, the dialectic process begins anew. Its first moment consists in the 
affirmation of the order which does not correspond any more to the ideals 
of justice. Against this law, to which only formal validity is attributed, 
surges the revolution as a negating movement, and the process culminates 
in a new order which officially consecrates the desires and aspirations of 
those who provoke and realize the movement. Thus, once again, the coin- 
cidence of the two criteria is, supposedly, achieved within another positive 
order, and through the internal logic of the process the revolutionary power 
converted into sovereign authority stops being the champion of justice and 
becomes in turn the paladin of legality. 
The union of the attributes of formal validity and intrinsic validity in 
one and the same juridical order represents not only the overcoming of its 
possible antagonism but also the best guarantee that this order be respected. 
When the subjects are convinced that the valid law realizes justice, they 
regard the norms of this law as intrinsically valid, and obedience appears 
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spontaneously. But if no such value is attributed to the norms, far from 
feeling bound by the law, the individuals feel themselves subjected only to 
power. The unjust order, enforced by the despot on the basis of the prin- 
ciple of legality, is negated by the subjects in the light of the axiological 
model. In this way the relation of tension reappears. It breaks the harmony; 
there is no more correspondence between what the state considers as law 
and what is valid as such for the juridical conscience of the citizens. The 
efficiency of the system begins to weaken and the battle of valuations pro- 
vokes resistances and conflicts whose gravity increases in the measure in 
which the discrepancy grows. I t  is then that the problem acquires dramatic 
dimensions; for now it ceases to be academic and becomes a vital problem 
which must be solved at any cost. Which of the two points of view must be 
chosen, not only as a philosophical or scientific criterion but as a norm of 
action? Is it enough to adjust oneself to one of them proposed, respectively, 
by the dogmatic jurist and the juridic philosopher, or does one have to 
look for a higher principle above the original attitudes? 
Even though the positions described differ among themselves and lead 
to the knowledge of different objects, it is in any case a question of atti- 
tudes assumed by man, whether as philosopher or as sociologist or as jurist 
of the state. And man, or better the person, cannot be locked indefinitely 
in any one of the three viewpoints. He feels the urgency of embracing an 
exhaustive point of view, capable of comprehending a firm knowledge of 
the limits and relations of all three of them. This desire responds to a 
moral necessity rather than a purely theoretical consideration. For, from 
the diversity of the typical attitudes, and above all from the opposition 
between philosophical and dogmatic posture, can grow conflicts which may 
put in the balance the ethical destiny of every person. When, as in Antigone 
or in the very real case of Socrates, one has to choose between the legal 
command and the dictates of justice, the problem is no more a merely 
technical but a vital one in front of which one has forcibly to take a stand. 
The last word in every case is pronounced by the person in conflict; and 
the only indisputable imperative is the faithfulness to one's own conscience. 
Socrates and Antigone followed opposite paths but they both obeyed their 
inner voice, 
Although from a strictly logical point of view it is impossible to affirm 
the simultaneous applicability of the two laws, it is indubitable that the 
theory of the ius naturae has played, and is continuously playing, a role of 
extraordinary importance in the life of nations. Conscious or not of the 
juridical principle of sufficient reason, dictatorships could become defend- 
ers of positivistic monism and support their demands at the point of bayo- 
nets; but in the light of this principle the juridical conscience of individuals 
and peoples will always oppose the pretended law of force with the indom- 
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itable force of that other law which is not derived from the arbitrariness 
of the mighty but from eternal values. 
At each step one hears the trivial objection that the ius ilat~lrnle is not 
true law because it is not positive. Those who reason this way are not 
aware that the force of the doctrine of ius izaturne, the force which convcrts 
it into the ferment and motor of history, is precisely the fact that the ideals 
it postulates hover above the fact of positivity and are at one and the same 
time, as Stammler would say, the polar star of social reality and the touch- 
stone of all institutions. 
Even though it is true that we do not have infallible criteria for the just 
and the unjust, this must not lead us to an attitude of resigned abdication 
before the demands of those who have forgotten juridical ideals. Let us 
concede that there exists no definition of justice acceptable to everyone. 
How can we deny, however, that there is a common fund of convictions 
and sentiments about this value? Far from constituting a privilege of the 
strong, its realization is an obligation for all members of the political com- 
munity. The responsibility of such realization is common to all since as 
individuals we not only are "subjects" but also "citizens" in the sense 
Rousseau gave to these words. On the other hand, the problem of justice 
is not only an academic question but an eminently practical task which 
interests all and to the solution of which we all can-in larger or smaller 
degree-contribute. Sancho was not a jurist but he knew how to be a good 
judge in his island of Barataria. 
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